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MANPOWER PROBLEMS IN A CAPITAL-RICH COUNTRY: 
THE CASE OF SAUDI ARABIA 
Robert E. Looney 
Introduction 
While oil revenues have provided the key to development in Saudi 
Arabia, finance alone is no guarantee of economic success. Important 
requirements for development are labour, management skills, 
technology, land and above all, organization. Organization is vital 
because of the scale and pace of development in the Kingdom. 
Given the small entrepreneurial class that existed at the 
beginning of the 1970s, economic planning has been an essential 
feature of the Government's economic policies, particularly following 
the oil price increases of 1973/1974. Through the planned expansion 
of the basic infrastructure, the Government hopes to stimulate 
sufficient private sector investment to eventually diversify the 
economy and make it less dependent on developments in the 
international oil market. 
The first two five-year plans Cl 970-1980)11 concentrated almost 
exclusively on basic infrastructure to provide the foundations on 
which industry could be established. Tremendous progress was made 
in the construction of roads, ports and airports and in the expansion of 
telecommunications and power generation. At the same time, social 
welfare facilities such as hospitals, clinics and schools were 
established throughout the country. These activities had a major 
impact on the construction sector, while the heavy reliance on 
imports and foreign labour stimulated commercial growth. 
In the Third Plan (1980-1985) the emphasis was changed. 
Particular emphasis was laid on the development of hydrocarbons and 
the manufacturing industry, and concern was voiced about the 
increasing dependence on non-Saudi Arabian labour. Massive growth 
in the capital stock led to an emphasis on operations and maintenance, 
causing a switch from capital to recurrent expenditures. 
The completion of the Third Plan in early 1985, and the initiation 
of the more modest Fourth Plan following the decline in oil revenues 
and the weakening of the solidarity of the Organization of Petroleum 
Exporting Countries (OPEC), indicate that Saudi Arabia may have 
reached a watershed in its development efforts. In particular, the 
country may have to reassess the assumptions concerning manpower 
usage and productivity that a.re implicit in its development strategy. 
l/ For a. discussion of the evolution of Saudi Arabia's planning 
efforts, see Looney and Frederiksen 1985. 
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In order to gain an insight into possible problems in the Fourth Plan, 
this paper will assess several aspects of the manpower situation that 
were inherent in the Third Plan. 
Overview of the Third Plan 
The Third Plan departed from the preceding plans (Looney 1982) 
in several areas. The First and Second Plans targeted high growth 
rates in all sectors; both had a policy of allowing the relatively free 
importation of foreign labour to satisfy manpower requirements. The 
Third Plan was much more selective, opting for high growth in those 
areas which Saudi Arabian planners felt had demonstrated proven 
potential. Clearly implied in the Plan was the country's major 
long-term objective: to contain and eventually to reduce the size of 
the foreign labour force. 
In contrast to the emphasis placed by the Second Plan on 
infrastructure development designed to increase the absorptive 
capacity of the economy, the Third Plan concentrated on increasing 
the efficient utilization of the labour force - both domestic and 
foreign - in hydrocarbons (usually highly capital-intensive), and in 
other manufacturing industries (especially in the agricultural and 
mining sector). As in the past, the overall goal was to diversify the 
economic base of the nation. 
In retrospect, it is clear that the development of the Plan largely 
revolved around the achievement of rapid increases in productivity 
(sec table 1). If the Second Plan had not achieved the productivity 
increases that it did, labour force requirements would probably have 
been more than twice as great as they actually were. Similarly, the 
increase in productivity anticipated in the' Third Plan would have 
required 550,000 fewer workers, a significant figure given the 
projected total of 155,000 required for the period. As the 
participation rate of Saudi Arabian nationals in the labour force was 
declining slightly, the bulk of the workers hired in the absence of 
increased productivity would have had to have been foreign (El 
Mallakh and El Mallakh 1982). It should be noted that the decline in 
Saudi Arabian participation was a direct result of the expansion of the 
Kingdom's education and training programmes. 
Capital and skill-intensive developments within each of the 
specific sectors were assumed to be the driving force behind produc-
tivity during· the Third Plan perlod. High productivity projects, 
financed with the aid of the Saudi Industrial Development Fund, were 
to provide the impetus through which manufacturing would achieve 
the targeted increases in productivity. · · · 
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TABLE 1. GROWIH TARGETS FOR THE NON-OIL ECONOMY, 
1980-1985 
(Percentage annual growth) 
Employment GDP Productivity 
~roducing sectors 
Agriculture -2.46 5.35 8.0 
Other mining 6.07 9.78 3.5 
Other manufacturing 9.52 18.83 8.5 
Utilities 8.33 29.46 19.5 
Construction -5.77 -2.48 3.5 
Subtotal services -1.48 2.18 S.7 
Trade 1.80 8.42 6.5 
Transport 5.05 12.93 7.5 
Finance 5.18 7.29 2.0 
Other services 0.94 2.95 2.0 
Government 5.57 7.16 1.5 
Subtotal 3.06 8.84 5.6 
Non--oil economy 1.16 6.19 5.0 
Source: Saudi Arabia: The Development Dilemma. Economist 
Intelligence Unit, Special Report No. 116,. 
Macro-economic Relationships 
In order to evaluate the consistency and consequences of the 
provisions of the Third Plan for manpower and manpower-related 
concerns, a macro-economic model capabl~ of· simulating the 
economy under different sets of constraints and objectives was 
developed. The model was designed to examine the economy from the 
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perspective of the resource availabilities and requirements associated 
with alternative growth scenarios during the Third Plan, all within the 
ultimate framework of the optimal control programme.l/ A main 
feature of the model was its ability to determine the most efficient 
growth path available to the authorities during the early 1980s to 
enable end targets to be reached. The model forecasts the non-oil 
income growth rate, the inflation rate and the implications of the 
size of the foreign work-force on alternative spending rates.~/ The 
main features of the model include the following:~/ 
1. Seventeen accounting equations for real national income and 
three nominal monetary relationships; 
2. A distinction between oil income and non-oil gross domestic 
product (GDP); 
3. A production function (Cobb-Douglas) that links non-oil 
income to capital, labour and productivity; 
4. The influence of government expenditure on private 
consumption, which probably reflects public-private competition for 
resources, i.e., the crowding out of public consumption; 
5. Numerous structural shift dummy variables that depict the 
impact on oil revenues following the 1973/1974 oil price increases; 
6. A casual monetary link between nominal government 
expenditure, reserve money, the money supply and inflation; 
7. The influence of world inflation on the country's terms of 
trade; 
8. A series of exogenous variables: oil prices and production 
rates, which depict the slow-down in world oil demand. 
l/ The concept of optimal control is fairly straightforward, 
involving the optimization of a certain objective given a certain loss 
function such as the rate of inflation. See, for example, Chow 
1975. For an example of its application to an oil-based economy, 
see Looney 1985. 
'!!_/ The econometric model used to depict the major economic 
forces assumed to be at work in the economy during the Third Plan 
period was estimated by a two-stage-least-squares estimation 
method with annual data for the period 1960-1979. The data were 
obtained from the Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency, Annual Report 
(various issues). 
QI Copies of the equations of the model, together with its statistical 





Utilizing the macro-economic model presented above, the 
optimum control simulations were designed to test the consistency of 
the objectives of the Third Five-year Plan. Real government 
investment was selected as the instrument variable (the main policy 
variable at the disposal of the authorities) in each of the simulations. 
This was based on the assumption that the Saudi Arabian authorities 
were likely to have more control over capital expenditure than over 
current expenditure (salaries, etc.). 
For the purposes of simulation, the major socio-economic 
objectives of the Third Plan were classified as follows: 
1. Growth objective: the real non-oil gross domestic product was 
to increase at a minimum acceptable rate of 6.19 per cent per annum 
during the period 1980-1985; 
2. Social objective: the labour force was to increase at a 
maximum of 1.6 per cent per annum, reflecting the priority of 
the gradual reduction of the country's dependence on foreign 
workers; 
3. Stability of the absorptive capacity objective: operationally 
specified as a rate of inflation of under 10 ten per cent, and 
preferably in the range of 7 to 8 per cent; 
4. Ideological objective: the gradual replacement of government 
involvement through the participation of the private sector in an 
essentially free market economy, wherein the share of private sector 
activity relative to government activity would increase fairly rapidly, 
particularly in view of the completion of many of the major 
government infrastructure projects. 
With regard to the last point, it should be noted that the actual 
target of private to government involvement in the economy has 
never been publicly articulated by the Saudi Arabian authorities. For 
the purposes of simulation, however, it seemed appropriate to set as a 
target the rough balance between private and government expenditure 
which existed prior to the 1973 oil boom, that is, a ratio of about one 
to one (compared with the 1980 ratio of private to government 
expenditure of 0.66). 
Simulation Results 
The first set of simulations were based on the assumption that 
the Saudi Arabian authorities were determined to gradually reduce the 
foreign work force throughout the Third Plan period; that is, the 
growth of the labour force was to be held to an absolute maximum of 
1.16 per cent per annum. 
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The simulated growth paths (see table 2) illustrate several 
fundamental trade-offs that constrained Saudi Arabian policy makers 
throughout the Third Plan, and which may continue to do so well into 
the period of the Fourth Plan (1985-1990): 
1. It is clear that strategies for high growth (6.19 per cent or 
more per annum) in real non-oil GDP, together with the objectives of 
price stability to increase private sector participation in the economy, 
were incompatible with a significant retluction in the foreign 
work-force; 
2. Real income growth in the target range of 6.19 per cent per 
annum would probably be difficult to sustain without incurring double 
digit inflation (see paths I, II and VI of table 2); 
3. A significant increase in the relative share of private sector 
expenditure could take place only at considerable cost in terms of 
reduced overall growth in GDP (see paths III and IV); 
4. Similarly, inflation could be maintained at moderate rates 
(5 per cent and 10 per cent per annum) only at the expense of a 
significant reduction in real income growth (see paths III and IV); 
5. The best compromise among policy objectives (assuming each 
has more or less equal priority) appears to be one of moderate growth 
with non-oil income expansion in the 5 per cent range, under 
conditions of minimum inflation (see path V of table 2). 
It should be noted that if path V had been followed, such a 
strategy would not only have assured an increase in sustained real 
income, but would also have allowed price stability to be maintained 
while meeting objectives regarding the foreign labour force. At the 
same time, there would have been a significant increase in the 
relative participation of the private sector in the economy, with an 
increase in the ratio of private to government expenditure from 0.66 
in 1980 to 0.91by1985. 
From the perspective of the early 1980s, these simulations could 
be considered to be either encouraging or discouraging, depending on 
the point of view taken. On the one hand, without any fundamental 
structural change in the economy (and given the unprecedented rates 
of increase in labour productivity), from the beginning the Kingdom 
was quite unlikely to achieve its major development objectives (in the 
absence of any major changes in oil markets). On the other hand, the 
picture could have changed fairly drastically if the authorities had 
relaxed their policy on foreign workers. Again, from the perspective 
of 1980, this latter hypothesis was tested assuming: 
1. Fixed growth targets (see table 3); 
2. Inflationary ceilings (see table 4); 
3. Relative rates of private sector expansion were given priority 






TABLE 2. SAUDI ARABIA: ALTERNATIVE GROWTH STRATEGIES UNDER 
LABOUR FORCE CONSTRAINTS, 1981-1985 
(Averaqe annual qrowth rates) 
Growth strategy I II III IV 
Non- oil GDP 7.8 6.2 1.0 1.3 
Private consumption 5.4 9.2 ll.3 11.8 
Private investment 4.1 4.9 2.4 2.4 
Private expenditure 5.1 11.1 9.4 9.8 
Government investment 14.1 4.7 -4.6 -6.4 
Government consumption 11.9 9.2 1. 7 1.1 
Government expenditure 12.8 7.4 -0.7 -1. 7 
Non-oil deflator 10.1 13.2 5.1 5.0 
Ratio of private/government 
expenditure (1985) 0.44 0.74 1.00 1.00 











Note: The average annual growth of the labour force has been held at 1.16 per cent in all 
of the strategies. 
Growth strategy assumptions: 
I High growth with price stability - non-oil gross domestic product def lator maximum is 
equal to 10 per cent per annum; maximum rate of increase in non-oil GOP. 
11 'l'hird Plan target growth under minimum inflation conditions - target growth in non-oil 
GDP equal to 6.19 per cent; minimize inflation. 
III High private sector participation with growth - ratio of private to government 
expenditure was equal to one by 1985; maximum rate of growth. 
rv· High private sector participation with price stability - ratio of private to 
government expenditure was equal to one by 1985; minimize inflation. 
v Moderate growth-high stability plan - target rate of non-oil GDP is equal to 5. 0; 
minimize inflation. 
IV Third Plan growth target with maximum private sector participation -· non-·oil GDP 















TABLE 3. SAUDI ARABIA: MINIMUM PATTERNS OF INFLATION IN ALTERNATIVE 
"'ti 
GROWTH PATHS, 1981-1985 0 
'O (Average annual growth rates) ~ 
I» 
Non-oil gross domestic product Non-oil gross domestic product c-t .... 
0 growth target 10.0 growth target 8.0 
==' 
Average of annual rate of increase Average of annual rate of increase t::d 
in labour force in labour force § 
1.16 2.0 3.0 4.0 5.0 1.16 2.0 3.0 4.0 5.0 
(1) g. 
Non-oil GDP 10.0 10.0 10.0 10.0 10.0 8.1 8.0 8.0 8.9 8.0 0 Private consumption 13.6 13.0 11.8 13.4 14.2 11.6 13.7 12.4 14.4 13.5 ...., 
Private investment 6.5 6.5 6.6 6.5 6.7 5.5 5.5 5.6 6.5 5.7 l:z:I Ul 
Private expenditure 12.1 11.5 10.6 11.8 12.5 10.2 11.9 10 .8 12.6 11. 7 CJ 
Government investment 11. 7 12.4 13.9 10.9 9.7 10.9 7.0 9.4 8.9 5.9 ~ > Government consumption 14.9 14.6 14.2 13.0 12.3 12.4 11.0 11.0 11. 7 9.0 
Government expenditure 13.7 13.8 14.1 12.2 11.3 11.8 9.4 10.4 10.6 7.7 
I Non-oil deflator 18.9 18.0 16.5 16 .2 15.8 15.3 15.8 14.3 16.l 11.9 w 
co Ratio of private/government 
expenditure (1985) 0.58 0.56 0.53 0.61 0.66 0.58 0.70 0.64 0.68 0.75 
Non-oil gross domestic product Non-oil gross domestic product 
growth target 6.19 growth target 4.0 
Non--oil GDP 6.2 6.2 6.2 6.8 7.9 3.4 3.9 4.5 5.2 5.8 
Private consumption 1/.. 9 12.2 16.4 13.4 12.7 11.0 11.5 12.0 12.5 13.0 
Private investment 4.8 4.7 4.6 4.8 5.6 3.4 3.6 4.0 4.3 5.6 
Private expenditure 11.2 10.5 13.9 11.5 11.l 8.4 9.7 10.2 10.7 ll. l 
Government investment 4.7 5.4 -6.3 4.4 9.1 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 
Government consumption 9.2 8.8 6.5 8.1 10.1 5.6 5.6 5.6 5.6 5.6 
Government expenditure 7.4 7.5 2.0 6.8 9.7 4.2 4.2 4.2 4.2 4.2 
Non-oil deflator 13.2 11.6 13.1 12.1 12.9 8.2 8.3 8.4 8.5 8.7 
Ratio of private/government 
expenditure (1985) 0.74 0.71 1.09 0.77 0.66 0.79 0.81 0.82 0.84 0.86 
-----
source: Figures calculated by the author. 
Manpower Problems 
With the expansion of the labour force from the Third Plan target 
rate of 1.16 per annum to 5.0 per cent per annum, it would appear (see 
table 3) that: 
1. Some inflationary pressures could be reduced by the greater 
infusion or retention of foreign workers than was originally planned; 
2. With inflation held at about 8 per cent and the labour force 
increasing in the range of 4-5 per cent, real growth in the region of 
about 6 per cent could be achieved, together with a gradual increase 
in the relative share of private sector participation; 
3. Growth rates of 8 per cent and above would clearly be 
undesirable in any reasonable labour force policy. Expansion of this 
magnitude would produce an unacceptable level of inflation and a 
probable decline in the relative participation of the private sector in 
the economy. 
In general, these conclusions are supported by the results of 
simulations that identify the maximum non-oil GDP growth rates (see 
table 4) that would be attainable under alternative inflation 
constraints: 
1. Rates of growth in the region of 6 or 7 per cent may be 
possible at the expense of the relative expansion of the private sector; 
2. Significant private sector expansion seems possible only under 
greatly reduced overall growth conditions. 
The following conclusions can be drawn with regard to relative private 
sector expansion (see table 5): 
1. Higher labour force growth rates facilitate the relative 
expansion of the private sector; 
2. A significant increase in the relative contribution of the 
private sector to expenditure can only take place at the expense of 
overall income and growth; 
3. Moderate increases in the relative degree of private sector 
participation in the economy would be possible with fairly high single 
digit inflationary growth paths. 
Implications of the Third Plan 
The above analysis describes a number of growth plan projections 
that differ from the original Third Plan targets. This results primarily 
from assumptions about the rate of growth in the labour force which 
deviate from those of the Plan. The assumptions about changes in the 
labour force, the capital stock and productivity required for these 
simulations were within reasonable (albeit politically sensitive) bounds 
in terms of the situation that existed· in the early 1980s. The main 
conclusion to be drawn from an analysis of the possibilities open to 
the authorities during the Third Five-year Plan is that, given the oil 
revenues assumed at that time, it was unlikely that all of the Plan's 
objectives could be achieved simultaneously. This is not to say that 
- 39-
TABLE 4. SAUDI ARABIA: PATTERNS OF GROWTH UNDER INFLATIONARY CONSTRAINTS, "'d 0 1981-1985 "d 
(Average annual growth rates) g. I» 
.... 
.... 
Inflationary constraint 14.5 Inflationary constraint 12.5 0 :=' 
Average of annual rate of increase Average of annual rate of increase b::I g. in labour force in labour force ...... 
1.16 2.0 3.0 4.0 5.0 1.16 2.0 3.0 4.0 5.0 
(1) 
.... 
Non-oil GDP 8.6 8.9 9.5 10.1 10.6 7.2 7.5 8.1 8.6 9.2 a· 
Private consumption 9.0 10.3 9.9 10.5 11.0 8.5 10.5 9.8 10.l 11. 7 0 ..... 
Private investment 5.5 5.8 6.1 6.3 6.5 4.6 5.1 5.1 5.3 6.0 l:z:1 Ul 
Private expenditure 7.2 9.2 9.0 9.2 10.0 7.6 9.2 8.8 9.0 10.4 () 
Government investment 14.7 13.3 14.6 14.6 14.5 12.3 10.3 11.9 12.5 10.9 ~ Government consumption 13.7 13.3 13.6 13.6 13.6 11.6 11.l 11.5 11.4 11.3 
Government expenditure 13.9 13.3 14.0 13.8 13.9 11.9 10.8 11. 7 11.6 11.1 
I Non-oil deflator 14.5 14.5 14.6 14.7 14.7 12.0 12.5 12.3 12.2 12.7 
b- Ratio of private/government 0 
I 
expendifure (1985) 0.47 0.52 0.50 0.51 0.52 0.52 0.58 0.55 0.55 0.60 
Inflationary constraint 10.0 Inflationary constraint 7.5 
Non-oil GDP 5.6 6.5 7.0 7.6 8.2 3.4 3.8 7.4 5.0 8.6 
Private consumption 9.1 10.5 11.0 11.4 11.8 10.2 10.7 1.9 11.3 2.6 
Private investment 3.8 4.6 4.8 5.1 5.4 3.1 3.3 2.9 3.8 3.4 
Private expenditure 7.9 8.2 9.6 10.0 10.4 8.6 9.1 2.1 9.6 2.5 
Government investment 8.1 6.9 6.8 6.8 6.8 2.5 2.3 17.5 2.6 16.9 
Government consumption 9.0 8.8 8.8 8.8 8.7 5.5 5.4 11.2 5.2 11.5 
Government expenditure 8.6 8.0 8.0 8.0 8.0 4.3 4.2 13.3 4.2 13.9 
Non-oil deflator 9.9 10.0 10.0 10.0 10.0 7.5 7.5 7.5 7.3 7.5 
Ratio of private/government 
expenditure (1985) 0.60 0.65 0.67 0.68 0.70 0.76 0.78 0.37 0.80 0.37 
Source: Figures calculated by the author. 
TABLE 5. SAUDI ARABIA: MAXIMUM PARTICIPATION OF THE PRIVATE SECTOR 
IN ALTERNATIVE GROWTH PATHS, 1981-1985 
(Average annual growth rates) 
Non-oil gross domestic product Non-oil gross domestic product 
growth target 8.0 growth target 6.19 
--·--·----Average of annual rate of increase Average of annual rate of increase 
in labour force in labour force 
1.16 2.0 3.0 4.0 5.0 __L_l6 2.0 3.0 4.0 -~~-
-Non-oil GDP 8.0 8.0 8.1 8.0 8.0 6.2 6.2 6.2 6.2 6.2 
Private consumption 12.9 13.3 13.8 13.9 14.3 12.6 12.8 D. l 13.3 13.3 
Private investment 6.0 6.1 6.1 6.1 6.0 5.1 5.1 o.O 5.0 4.8 
Private expenditure 11.3 11.7 12.1 12.2 12.4 10.9 10.1 11.3 11.5 11.4 
Government investment 9.9 9.1 8.1 7.0 5.9 6.7 5.8 4.8 3.6 2.7 
Government consumption 12.4 11. 7 11.0 10. l 9.2 9.8 9.1 8.3 ., • 'J 6.3 
l Government expenditure 11.4 10.7 9.8 8.9 7.9 8.6 7.8 6.9 5.8 4.9 
.I> Non-oil deflator 16.1 15.6 15.0 14.1 13.2 13.5 12.8 11.9 10.9 9.6 
..... 
I Ratio, private/government 
expenditure (1985) 0.62 0.65 0.69 0.72 0.72 0.69 0.72 0.76 0.81 0.84 
Non-oil gross domestic product Non-oil gross domestic product 
Growth target 4.0 Growth target 2.0 
Non-oil GDP 4.0 4.0 4.5 5.1 5.7 1.9 0.1 1.9 0.9 0.1 
Private consumption 11.5 11.8 12.2 12.6 13.1 10.3 9.3 10.2 10.5 11. 2 
Private investment 3.8 3.8 4.0 4.3 4.6 2.5 1.6 2.4 1.9 1. 7 
Private expenditure 9.7 10.7 10.3 10.8 12.3 8.5 7.6 8.5 8.8 9.2 ~ 
I!" Government investment 3.0 1.9 1.5 1.5 1.5 -1.5 -4.2 -2.8 -7.6 -12.4 .g 
Government consumption 6.6 5.8 5.4 5.4 5.4 2.8 -0.4 1.2 --2. l -5.1 0 
Government expenditure 5.2 4.2 3.9 3.9 3.9 1.1 -1.9 -·O .4 -4.2 --7 .8 ~ (II 
Non-oil deflator 9.6 8.8 8.4 8.5 8.7 5.3 1.4 3.1 0.8 -l.3 o; 
Ratio, private/government '"d o; 0 
expenditure (1985) 0.77 0.82 0.84 0.86 0.88 0.89 0.99 0.95 1.18 .l.45 ct .... 
(II 
sources: Figures calculated by the author. fl 
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the Plan was based on an unsound analysis, but only that even under 
the most favourable assumptions concerning external factors, it was 
unlikely that all of the main targets of the Plan would be fulfilled. It 
is of interest to examine the outcome of the Plan so as to ascertain 
what the Government decided to emphasize and what it decided to 
sacrifice. 
Results of the Third Plan 
The targeted average annual growth rate of 6.2 per cent for the 
non-oil economy was higher than the planned growth of the labour 
force. Productivity growth was perceived to be critical in the 
attempt to limit foreign manpower. In reality, however, this 
relationship did not materialize. The foreign labour force grew by 
over 1.1 million during the Third Plan period (representing an overall 
annual rate of 11. 7 per cent), compared with the planned increase of 
0.2 per cent (Saudi Arabia, Ministry of Planning 1985, p. 12). 
The moderate rate of growth apparently resulted from a 
reduction in the demand for crude oil, latent domestic inflation, 
together with possible supply bottle-necks. Increased oil revenues in 
the early years of the Plan and the subsequent sharp decline affected 
the scale and annual distribution of government expenditure over the 
entire Plan period. In particular, the oil price increases of 19 7 9 and 
1980, together with the surge in demand for oil, combined to modify 
assumptions about the volume and value of oil exports. Increased 
defence requirements and special infrastructural developments 
claimed additional government funds. As oil exports and revenues 
rose immediately at the start of the Third Plan, so did government 
spending. Following the downturn in the demand for oil in the later 
years of the Third Plan, government spending, especially that on new 
projects, was reduced. This brought the average growth of the non-oil 
economy closer to its planned course (Saudi Arabia, Ministry of 
Planning 1985, p. 12). 
The net effect of these trends over the Plan period as a whole 
was that the non-oil economy grew at an average rate of 5.1 per cent, 
somewhat below the 6.2 per cent targeted in the Plan. At the same 
time the sectoral growth rates in the non- oil economy began to 
reflect the desired structural change toward strong growth in 
manufacturing, agriculture and financial services. As anticipated, 
the construction sector entered a phase of gradual contraction (see 
table 6). 
In terms of private/public sector expenditures (expressed in 
billions of Saudi Arabian riyals, S Rls), in the period as a whole there 




















subtotal: non-oil sectors 
Oil sectors 
Gross domestic product 
Value 
(based on current prices) 
1399/1400 1404/1405 




270.8 ( -1, 486. 9) !;!/ 
43,107.6 45,541.4 
Average annual growth 








17,759.7 27,591.5 8.4 8.8 
15,748.6 23,430.6 12.9 7.1 
10,962.3 12,394.9 7.3] QI 2.1 
4,574.5 16,695.6 ] 13.l 
5,260.4 11,057.l 3.0 7.9 
23,38~.8___ 54,700.1 7.2 5.8 
133,543.2 215,627.7 6.2 5.1 
250 ,_Q46. 4 14£,_488. 5 1~_4 - -- (-14. 6) 
383,589.6 358,116.2 3.2 (-5.8) 
source: Saudi Arabia, Ministry of Planning, 1985, p.15. 
Notes: 
!;!I Negative value added in 1404/1405 reflecting subsidized producer prices. 
QI Planned growth for real estate and financial services combined. 















Population Bulletin of ESCWA 
Private Private Private to 
Government Government invest- consmnp- govc1nment 
Year investment consumption ment ti on ratio 
1980 61.6 77.6 23.2 102.tl 0.90 
1981 66.8 81.9 28.7 114.9 0.97 
1982 73.9 128.5 35.8 126.5 0.80 
1983 66.4 126.9 34.2 151.3 0.96 
1984 50.0 121.8 41.1 1!>7.3 1.15 
1985 43.0 115.8 38.6 146.0 1.16 
Furthermore, the ratio of government expenditure to value added 
in the non-oil economy became less dependent on the demand 
generated by public spending. It should be pointed out, however, that 
economic growth remained dependent on the high overall ratel/ of 
investment relative to non--oil GDP, as can be seen from the following 
(where expenditures are expressed in billions of Saudi Arabian riyals): 
Total Non-oil Investment/ 
Year investment GDP non-oil GDP 
1980 84.8 130.9 0.65 
1981 95.5 157.3 0.61 
1982 109.7 184.3 0.60 
1983 100.6 205.4 0.49 
1984 91.1 209.6 0.43 
1985 81.6 203.4 0.40 
With regard to the composition of government expenditure, the 
reduction in investment was in part compensated for by increased 
expenditure on health and social development (see table 7). 
The increase in total employment at an average annual rate of 
8.0 per cent (or 1,420,000), in the Third Plan period far exceeded the 
targeted rate of 1.2 per cent. By the end of the period, the 
employment of civilians by the Government declined from 13.2 per 
cent to 10.5 per cent of total employment. The service sectors, trade 
and financial services showed the greatest proportionate growth in 
employment. 
However, while total employment expanded rapidly during the 
Third Plan period, the Saudi Arabian component of this growth was 
l/ Saudi Arabia's rate of increase and level of investment relative to 






TABLE 7. ALLOCATION OF DEVELOPMENT GOVERNMENT EXPENDITURE IN THE THIRD PLAN: 
A COMPARISON OF PLAN ALLOCATIONS, BUDGET APPROPRIATIONS AND ACTUAL 
EXPENDITURE 
A. Development sectors Distribution 
Plan Budget Actual 
(Percentage) 
Economic and social 
Economic resources 27.6 17. 7 18.3 
Human resources 18.8 18.8 18.8 
Health/social 
development 8.8 10.1 10.5 
··Infrastructure 
Municipalities/housing 12.9 19.3 16.5 
Transport/ 
communications 19.9 20.1 21.1 
:B. Specialized credit 
institutions 12.0 14.0 14.8 
Total percentage 100.0 100.0 100.0 
. Total expenditure 692.5 738.9 659.6 
(thousands of 
millions of SRls) 
Source: Saudi Arabia, Ministry of Planning, 1985, p.26 
Actual expenditure 
Value As percentage 
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only 292,800 persons, or approximately 21 per cent. The national 
labour force grew at an average annual rate of 3. 7 per cent, 
compared to the non-national growth rate of 11.8 per cent. The net 
result of these developments was a decline in the share of Saudi 
Arabian nationals in the total labour force, which fell from 49.4 per 
cent in 1980 to 40.2 per cent in 1985 (World Bank 1986, p. 31). 
The failure to achieve the desired increase in productivity 
probably constitute'd the greatest disappointment of the Third Plan. 
As was noted above, the growth in employment exceeded the rate of 
economic expansion in the period as a whole. The increase in private 
sector activities was a major factor behind the rapid increase in 
employment. Over-expansion was not limited to employment, but 
was also evident in the accumulatiOn of fixed assets and stock in the 
commercial sector. As a result, parts of the private sector, 
parLicularly com:truction, trade and distribution suffered from 
oversLaffing, underemployment, increased competition, lower 
margins and a substantial loss in productivity. By the end of the 
Third Plan period, therefore, the private sector was forced to 
initiate its own adjustments to the new economic conditions (World 
Bank 1986, p. 36). 
Although value added in the non- oil sector continued to grow 
throughout the period of the Third Plan, its rate of growth fell faster 
than that of employment, especially from the end of the second 
year. The net result was a progressive annual loss in the rate of 
growth of productivity: 
ProductivitY (value 
Year Value added Employment added/employment) 
1981 10.9 14.3 '· -2.9 '; 
1982 10.8 12.8 ·:•: -1.8 
1983 8.6 11.8 r -2.8 
1984 6.9 11.0 -3.7 
1985 5.1 8.0 -2.7 
Over the entire period, productivity declined at an average 
annual rate of 2.7. per cent. Therefore, while e-mployment rose by 
46.9 per cent in the Third Plan period, output - as measured by value 
added - increased by only 28.0 per cent. 
Industrial Employment Patterns 
While a comprehensive discussion of the productivity and 
manpower problems encountered during the Third Plan are beyond the 
scope of this paper, several clues as to the sources of these 
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difficulties can be found in a brief examination of the country's 
industrial strategy. 
It is interesting to note that much of the literature on technology 
transfer to the third world focuses on the problem of adapting 
technologies designed for labour-scarce, advanced, industrial 
economies to environments that have a relative abundance of labour. 
The employment problems of Saudi Arabia have been largely 
disregarded, perhaps because of abundant capital (from oil revenues), 
combined with a small population. Most obseqers presume that 
because of the relative similarities between the i'actor endowments in 
this part of the world and those of advanced,~~ . .:Countries, the 
labour-saving aspect of imported technology actll&!lY increases tl;le 
competitive position of the Kingdom in the international system 
CRad-Serecht 1979). Unfortunately for Saudi Arabia, however, the 
labour-saving capability of foreign industrial tec}}nology may have 
been more efficient in redur.ing national, rather than foreign 
manpower requirements. 
Since the mid-1970s, much of ·the Government's industrial 
development strategy has focused on the downstream activities of th~ 
petroleum sector. In order to import technology that is capable of 
utilizing oil and gas as feedstock for refining a~d petrochemical 
operations, joint Saudi Arabian-foreign ventures were undertaken; 
Most primary production facilities were completed by the end of 1985; 
and major petrochemical plants are currently operational. Equipped, 
with these facilities, Saudi Arabia is capable of achieving between 4 
and 5 per cent of the world's primary petrochemical -eroduction. 
1 
For purposes of classification, government officials distinguish 
between six types of industry: 
1. Group I includes chemicals, fertilizers, drugs and medicine, 
crude oil refining, rubber products and plastic product&; ·' 
2. Group II comprises iron and steel, aluminium, structural met'al 
products and fabricated metal products; . ".·· . 1, 3. Group III industry includes structural clay products, cement 
and cement products and non-metallic mineral produc~s; . . -t. 
4. Group IV is composed of textiles, clothing, footwear, paper 
products, chinaware and glass products; •" .. :r·•~ 
5. Group V includes furniture, machinery, equipment, consumer 
appliances, air conditioners and motor vehicles; 
6. Group VI comprises food pro~~cts, carbonated produc;ts, 
bakeries, ice storage af!.d warehousing. 1.~'.. • • • 
Saudi Arabian officials place heavy. ·industry in'· the primary and 
secondary industries classification; these· designations ref er both to 
their industrial function and to the size of plants. Fpr ~the purposes of 
the present study, the most useful classification ""is the size of 
investment. Primary industry refers to investments greater than $US 
100 million, while secondary industries include those within the range 
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Source:· Derived from Donald A. Wells 1986 "The Effects of Saudi 
Industrialization on Employment," Journal of Energy and Development 
(1986), pp. 273-284. . 
Note: Number of workers appears in parentheses. 
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of $US 20 million to $US 100 million. Light manufacturing 
corresponds to investments of less than $US 20 million (Wells 1986). 
The recent emphasis of Saudi Arabian industrialization clearly 
indicates that there is a movement toward capital-intensive 
operations (see talik 8). For all categories of firms under 
construction (which presumably were completed by the end of 1985), 
capital per worker was greater than that of enterprises in operation at 
the end of 1983. For primary industries in Group I, capital per worker 
was $US 1,051,000 for firms in operation and $US 42,302,900 for firms 
under construction. For the purposes of comparison, during 19 7 6 in 
the United States, capital per worker (in 1972 dollars) was $US 
151,000 in the petroleum sector, $US 65,000 in primary metals and 
$US 55,000 in chemical industries (Birks and Sinclair 1980). 
In terms of employment, the 180 per cent increase in industrial 
investment in new projects will increase the industrial labour force by 
approximately 35 per cent. The change in emphasis from light 
manufacturing to heavy industry is primarily responsible for this 
relatively small increase in the industrial labour force. Employment 
in light manufacturing accounts for about three quarters of total 
employment for the firms under construction. 
In spite of the massive investment in industry, the industrial 
labour force will continue to form only a small proportion of the total 
labour force. In the period 1985-1990, the Saudi Arabian labour force 
will comprise between 1.8 and 2.0 million persons. The figure of 
125,000 for industrial employment will represent only about 7 per r.ent 
of the Saudi Arabian total. 
At the same time, it is estimated that by 1990 there will still be 
more than 500,000 foreign workers in Saudi Arabia. Although there 
are no official statistics, it is clear that most workers in industry are 
non-Saudi Arabians <Birks and Sinclair 1980). 
As was noted above, the labour force increased during the Third 
Plan period by an annual average of 8.0 per cent (or by 1,420,000), 
which exceeds the target rate of 1.2 per cent. Interestingly enough, 
by the end of the Third Plan period, government civilian employment 
had declined from 13.2 per cent of total employment to 10.5 per 
cent. The service sectors, trade and financial services experienced 
considerable growth in their share of total employment. 
However, while total employment expanded rapidly during the 
Third Plan period, the Saudi Arabian component of this growth 
accounted for only 292,800 persons, or approximately 21 per cent. 
The Saudi Arabian labour force grew at an annual average of 3.7 per 
cent, while the non-Saudi Arabian growth rate was 11.8 per cent. The 
net result was a decline in the share of Saudi Arabian nationals in the 
total labour force, which fell from 49.4 per cent in 1980 to 40.2 per 
cent in 1985 (Saudi Arabia, Ministry of Planning 1985, p.31 ). 
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Generalizations Concerning Saudi Arabian Industrialization 
These above-mentioned trends in employment and productivity, 
together with recent assessmentslf of industrialization in Saudi 
Arabia, 
suggest the following: 
1. Investments have largely been made in projects that aim to 
utilize locally available raw materials. 
2. Basic industries have been created in isolation, without the 
support of vital intermediate and trans-sectional industries that might 
in time allow the growth of a self-perpetuating industrial base. 
Industrial development began as a function of factors unrelated to the 
socio- economic reality of the Kingdom, and resulted from the need to 
use the flared associated gas and accumulating capital. In other 
words, external conditions rather than the needs and capabilities of 
domestic society dictated the pace of t.hc process of 
industrialization. This led to a dependence on foreign manpower, 
expertise, management and technology. 
3. Abundant oil revenues in the 1970s and early 1980s tended to 
create a consumer-oriented society in which the relationship between 
productivity and reward largely disappeared. Many investment 
decisions were based on overly-optimistic economic assumptions and 
therefore were often speculative rather than economically viable. In 
other words, technology was selected on the basis of extrapolated 
resource factor endowments that assumed continued high oil revenues; 
they were based on an assessment of the country's long-range 
sustainable production factor proportions. The post-1982 decline in 
oil revenues changed the relative factor proportions from those of the 
period immediately following the years 1973/197 4 (Al-Moajil 1986, 
p.8). 
Development in a Capital-surplus Economy 
The abundant supply of capital has made it easier for Saudi 
Arabia to acquire modern forms of western technology. However, in 
practice there are a number of factors that offset these advantages: 
1. Because of the limited supply of skilled labour, the Kingdom 
was forced to adopt a development strategy based on capital as a 
substitute for labour. This reliance on capital-intensive technology 
increases the Kingdom's dependence on western countries; 
2. The complexity of modern technology aggravates this 
situ.at.ion in that it requires a greater number of foreign technicians; 
3. Packaged technology (turn- key projects) in which elite skilled 
!/ See Looney 1988, Nagi 1986 and Nagi 1982. 
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labourers, technicians and managers form part. of contract 
agreements, allows the prompt and efficient execution of contracts, 
but seldom enables Saudi Arabian nationals to acquire work 
experience and training (Nagi 1986). 
These patterns suggest that the possession of capital may not be 
a sufficient pre-condition for productive investment in the Kingdom 
in view of the limited absorptive capacity of non-oil-related 
production. The net result of these developments has been the 
creation of an industrial sector that is not capable of meeting the 
local demand for consumer goods. Slack petrochemical export 
markets (resulting from the excess world capacity), together with the 
post-1982 decline in oil revenues and high levels of aggregate demand 
(which are facilitated and sustained by oil revenues), have placed 
further pressure on the country's balance of payments because of the 
underdeveloped local consumer goods industries. Since 1983, Saudi 
Arabia's current account deficit has been second only to that of the 
United States. The country's external investments have declined from 
approximately $US 150 billion to less than $US 70 billion in order to 
support the high level of consumption enjoyed by the population. In 
principle, Saudi Arabia's supply of capital should have provided for 
both capital formation and consumption. 
In short, the country's current economic problems lie not so much 
in a lack of capital supply as in the ability of the economy to 
manufacture consumer goods locally (Nagi 1982). 
Consequences for Employment 
The pattern of industrialization and technology transfer in Saudi 
Arabia has resulted in an employment structure where <El-Shishini 
1978, p. 208): 
1. Imported industrial plants have a low labour-absorptive 
capacity; 
2. Workers moving out of agriculture have had to accept jobs in 
the low productivity tertiary sector, the only opportunity open to 
them; 
3. The sectoral distribution of the labour force was skewed in 
favour of the tertiary sector at a very early stage in economic 
development. 
As a result of these developments, several labour force patterns 
stand out in Saudi Arabia: 
1. The proportional importance of employment in the tertiary 
sector in Saudi Arabia during the first stages of industrialization 
constituted a premature and unfavourable phenomenon; 
2. Increases in employment in the tertiary sector do not reflect 
actual economic needs when they precede the growth of the 
commodity; rather they indicate unsuitable technical and investment 
policies in other sec tors; 
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3. Whereas in· the advanced countries during the first stages of 
industrialization, labour movements occurred in response to objective 
economic needs and were influenced by strong sectoral integration 
and the gradual dissemination of technological innovations, in Saudi 
Arabia labour shifts were mainly motivated by strong social 
aspirations; 
4. While revenues have provided the key to development in Saudi 
Arabia, finance alone is no guarantee of economic success. The 
prerequisites for development are labour, management skills, 
technology, land and, above all, organization. Given the scale and 
pace of development in the Kingdom, organization is vital; 
5. The abundance of fixed capital, or at least the means to 
acquire it, only emphasizes the scarcity of other resources in the 
Kingdom, notably the shortage of skilled indigenous labour to run new 
industries. 
Conclusions 
The Fourth Plan was initiated in March 1985. As was noted 
above, several of the Government's macro-economic targets had not 
been met by the end of the Third Plan. The Government met its 
overall targets for inflation, growth and private sector development, 
but did so with a foreign work force that was much larger than 
desired. In the political context of Saudi Arabia, this was clearly the 
most expedient strategy. 
The Fourth Plan is based upon four principal themes that address 
the Kingdom's long term challenges. First, there is increased concern 
with the operational efficiency of the Kingdom's resources and 
facilities. Secondly, the plan focuses on the diversification of 
production activities, especially in areas such as manufacturing, 
agriculture and finance. An annual GDP growth of 4 per cent is 
projected for the five-year period, with a planned growth of 15.5 per 
cent in industry, 9 per cent in financial and business services and 6 per 
cent in agriculture. The plan includes no provisions for further 
expansion in Government and envisages only negligible activity in 
large- scale construction. 
The third theme emphasizes the goal of reducing the number of 
foreign nationals working in the Kingdom by 500,000 persons. 
Labour-saving devices and techniques are expected to reduce the 
dependence on unskilled workers from abroad. The final - and 
possibly the most important - theme of the plan is to promote a more 
active role for the private sector in industries that are currently 
financed or administered by the Government. As an incentive, the 
Government has proposed that financial resources and facilities be 
made available to prospective investors. Other incentives to 
stimulate investment in domestic production and to promote local 
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growth will be implemented in the hope that the capital that is 
created can then be invested within Saudi Arabia .. 
The Fourth Plan includes a substantial number of carry-over 
projects from the Third Plan, some of which are underway, while 
others have not yet been started. Of the 3,226 projects set out in the 
Fourth Plan, 1,782 are listed being as under construction and due for 
completion in the new plan period. The remaining 1,444 projects are 
listed as "new" (Thomas 1985). The Fourth Plan is based on a 
projected average oil production of 3.85 million barrels per day for 
the five years of the plan. The plan also assumes an average net price 
of $US 25 per barrel (Thorn.as 1985). 
While it is too early to comment on the likely success or failure 
of the Fourth Plan, particularly in view of the continued decline in oil 
revenues, the experience of the Third Plan means that it is likely that 
the Government will use the size of the foreign work-force as a 
safety valve to achieve its priorities. 
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